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I. INTRODUCTION
In their text The American Constitutional Order: History, Cases, and Phi-
losophy', Professors Douglas W. Kmiec and Stephen B. Presser make it rea-
sonably clear that, historically, they see the American Constitution as an at-
tempt to implement directly natural law through the mechanism offundamental law.3 Kmiec and Presser suggest that if one reads Thomas Jeffer-
Professor of Law, William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Por-
tions of this review are based on State Constitutions in the Early American Republic: The
Experiment with Republican Government, which is the second chapter of THOMAS B.
MCAFFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
(2000). The author would like to thank Emily Chamberlain and Marsha Adams for looking
at an early draft of this paper and offering encouragement and support. He also thanks
Karen Casady for encouraging the process of considering such basic questions and seeking
to teach others.
1 DOUGLAS W. KMIEC & STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER:
HISTORY, CASES, AND PHILOSOPHY (1998).
2 For those who framed the American Constitution, natural law was the law imposed by the
science of biology, properly understood. One careful student of their thought concluded:
From the natural rights doctrine of the Declaration emerge two conclusions: that all men have
rights that governments must help them to secure; and that governments must be instituted
(and operated) with the consent of the governed. Consent follows from the equality of man-
kind; majority rule is the principle most faithful to that equality. The natural law doctrine of
the Declaration turns these desiderata into commandments, that must to the extent possible be
satisfied together. Somehow the governed, i.e., the majority, must strive to secure individual
rights at the same time it seeks to achieve the common good.
Charles R. Kesler, Natural Law and a Limited Constitution, 4 CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 549, 553
(1995).
3 These casebook authors follow others who have seen a connection between the natural
rights political philosophy of Jefferson and the individual rights philosophy of the federal
Bill of Rights. See, e.g., John P. Kaminski, Restoring the Declaration of Independence:
Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS 141 (Jon. Kukla ed.,
1987); Gene R. Nichol, Children of Distant Fathers: Sketching an Ethos of Constitutional
Liberty, 1985 Wisc. L. REV. 1305.
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son and/or John Locke carefully enough and concludes that Americans have (or
should have) a natural and inalienable right, it should follow that one also has
an aryument strongly favoring recognition of a fundamental constitutional
right. At least as fundamental to Kmiec and Presser is that this basic feature
of our constitutional order has largely been lost on "modem" law professors
and Supreme Court justices, who regularly say things that reflect another, in-
correct way of viewing the historical grounding of our constitutional order.
5
4 KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 136 (contrasting unfavored view of the Constitution "as
a self-contained positive enactment" with more favorable characterization as "a document to
be construed in light of the Declaration [of Independence] and the natural law principles it
summarized"; suggesting that "(m]uch modem commentary" supports only the narrower
view); id. at 137 (pointing to "considerable evidence that the framers had no intention of dis-
placing the fundamental natural law principles in the Declaration or the common law tradi-
tion that preceded its ratification"; Philadelphia Convention notes "suggest that judges were
expected to make reference to principles of natural justice in assaying constitutionality"); id.
at 139 (claiming that, for the framers, "the concept of unconstitutionality is not limited to
constitutional text"; the text was viewed as "a separate source of authoritative, declared,
positive law," but this did not imply that they were "repealing the inherent or undeclared
natural law"); id. at 141 (referring to "[t]he continuing significance of the natural law to con-
stitutional interpretation" as reflected, for example, in the natural rights provision of the
Pennsylvania Declaration of Rights); id. at 145 (Federalists had reservations about "putting it
in writing" because no list of rights "could capture all the natural rights of man, and those
not mentioned would then be argued to be conceded to the government"); id. at 147 (in
promising to draft a Bill of Rights, "Madison did not give up his fear that putting rights
down on paper might disparage unenumerated rights"); id. at 152 (suggesting that under the
language of the Ninth Amendment, "the vast body of unenumerated common or natural law
rights become judicially enforceable against the Congress"); id. at 153 ("Coincident with the
founders' understanding of the Constitution as drawn from multiple sources, written text as
well as universal principles of justice, early opinions often relied upon both.").
5 These authors, for example, are clearly sympathetic to the view that "the prevailing schol-
arly consensus misconceives the relevance of the Declaration [of Independence]." Dan
Himmelfarb, The Constitutional Relevance of the Second Sentence of the Declaration of In-
dependence, 100 YALE L.J. 169, 187 (1990). See KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 134.
In fairness to Himmelfarb, however, he freely acknowledges, as these casebook authors do
not, that "the proposition that the Constitution must be understood in light of the Declaration
has no necessary implications for the question of judicial review." See Himmelfarb, supra,
at 186 n. 102 (citing Barnett and Berns as competing examples of conclusions about the judi-
cial role that might be based on the Declaration). See also KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1,
at 153 (contending that Judge Bork "may misperceive the judicial role envisioned by Madi-
son"; summing up uses made by early Supreme Court of natural law principles in constitu-
tional adjudication); id. at 166, 167-68 (noting Justice Scalia's disclaiming of "the use of
natural law as a basis for evaluating whether legislative action is in accord with fundamental
principle"; finding his common law methodology, however, closer in spirit to the framers
than many would acknowledge); id at 167 (summing up Justice Kennedy's position as being
slightly more open-minded than Scalia to "finding" binding unwritten "principle").
It is noteworthy, however, that the Declaration's author did not draw the same conclu-
sions about the judicial role that these casebook authors would base on his writing. See, e.g.,
GERALD GUNTER & KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11-13 (13th ed. 1997)
(treating Jefferson's role in the early dispute over judicial review); id. at 20-21 (excerpting a
Jefferson letter giving the Executive an important role in constitutional decision-making). It
is, of course, impossible to know the views Jefferson would have held about the judicial role
in the world we have occupied since the Civil War; but the immediate controversies that
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The authors find that the project of our Constitution is rooted in the framers'
commitment to natural law as reflected in founding-era works, and they find
this same conclusion supported by modem scholars who are more sensitive to
these historical themes. Without question, however, the Declaration of Inde-
pendence is the key exhibit of the founding era's commitment to constitutional
law based on natural law and rights. 7 For it is there that we assert that those
public officials "we consent to be governed by, are bound, as we all are, to ob-
serve the 'unalienable rights of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."
8
Though initially posed as a question, these authors clearly believe that "the
Declaration and the vast body of common and natural law tradition" have
"governing significance today. In their minds it is clear, even though the
matter is again initially posed as a question, that the "participants at the federal
convention" did not seek to displace "the fundamental principles of the Decla-
ration with a written Constitution." A closely-related, potentially powerful
sparked his interest reflect that even the judicial role implementing fundamental rights did
not yield unwavering support for the judiciary.
6 See, e.g., KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 128, (excerpting, Clarence E. Manion, The
Natural Law Philosophy of Founding Fathers, in 1 NAT. L. INST. PROC. 3, 16 (1949) (find-
ing that the English had not been true to "the great traditions of the natural law and common
law"; concluding that Americans adopted the alternative declared in the Declaration of Inde-
pendence); id. at 127, (excerpting, Roscoe Pound, The Development of Constitutional Guar-
antees of Liberty, 20 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 347, 367 (1945) (concluding that Dean Pound
found that "America rejected legislative supremacy, and, thus, deliberately linked its written
Constitution to the fundamental natural law").7Beyond the Declaration itself, these authors cite statements at various points by Jefferson,
James Madison, Abraham Lincoln, Martin Luther King, Jr., The Federalist Papers, various
anti-Federalists, Dr. Harry V. Jaffa, and Dan Himmelfarb in support of their view that the
Declaration played a central role in generating (and reflecting) the ideas found in the Consti-
tution. See, e.g., KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 130-3 1. Calvin Coolidge is quoted, as
an example, for the claim that if we go back to before the Declaration, there are "no rights of
the individual, no rule of the people." Id. at 130, (quoting, CALVIN COOLIDGE, FOUNDATIONS
OF THE REPUBLIC, SPEECHES & ADDRESSES 452-52 (1928)). See also id. at 130 (citing,
CHARLES E. RICE, FIFTY QUESTIONS ON THE NATURAL LAW (1993)).
8 KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 129. It is for this reason, we assume, that the Declara-
tion is included in the United States Code "as one of the Organic Laws upon which all statu-
tory law rests." Id. at 130.
9 KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 135. The idea that the Declaration is to be viewed as
among Jefferson's great and permanent contributions to the good of the nation is an idea that
would have pleased Jefferson himself. See, e.g., PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN SCRIPTURE:
MAKING THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE 186 (1998). This conclusion seems indisput-
able, considering that Jefferson died on the fiftieth anniversary of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence and that he apparently clung to life to achieve this very purpose. Paul D. Carring-
ton, Remembering Jefferson, 2 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 455, 461 (1993).
10 Id. These casebook authors respond: "The short answer is no, or at least, not entirely. The
delegates coming to the constitutional convention of 1787 understood a constitution not as a
written document, but as the embodiment of long-established laws, traditions, and first prin-
ciples consistent with natural law."
In adopting the view that America's constitutionalism as of 1787 consisted of more than
what is contained in the written constitution, these casebook authors join what has become a
substantial scholarly tradition. See, e.g., Thomas C. Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten Con-
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premise of their argument is that a purpose of the federal Bill of Rights was to
enforce the "unenumerated natural rights"'11 referred to in the Declaration.
Most especially, these authors endorse the modem wisdom that this is why the
Ninth Amendment was included in the Bill of Rights--to prevent government
from eviscerating rights discoverable through reason and rooted in natural law12 ..
and common law. The Ninth Amendment was inserted to clarify the continu-
ing existence and constitutional status of unwritten natural and inalienable
13
rights , whether or not they have found their way to constitutional text or have
even been previously recognized in any way as fundamental. 14  For these au-
stitution? 27 STAN L. REv. 703 (1975); Suzanna Sherry, The Founders' Unwritten Constitu-
tion, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 1127 (1987), cited in, KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 136. But
see THOMAS B. MCAFEE, INHERENT RIGHTS, THE WRITTEN CONSTITUTION AND POPULAR
SOVEREIGNTY: THE FOUNDERS' UNDERSTANDING (2000). The question, however, may not be
whether the Constitution's framers sought to "displace" the principles of the Declaration, but
whether they viewed their construction and application of the Declaration's principles, apart
from what is found in the written Constitution, as binding upon "the people," then or now.
11 KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 153. The authors point to the existence of the Ninth
Amendment, which states: "The enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights shall not be
construed to deny or disparage the other rights retained by the people." U.S. Const. amend
Ix.
12 The Ninth Amendment "reaffirmed that the origin of these rights are not the written Con-
stitution itself," but they were pre-existing rights that were retained by the people. KMIEC &
PRESSER, supra note 1, at 148. According to these authors, then, Madison saw federal judges
as "a guardian of pre-existing common law or natural rights." Id. at 153. In drafting the
Ninth Amendment, Madison was seeking, we are told, to avoid the outcome "that putting
rights down on paper might disparage unenumerated rights." Id. at 147. See also id. at 1387
(acknowledging the existence of some academic support for Judge Bork's interpretation of
the Ninth Amendment, but characterizing his view primarily by his confirmation-era analogy
suggesting that it was an "inkblot" that cannot properly be addressed "unless you know
something of what it means" and concluding, "I do not think the court can make up what
might be under the inkblot"; stating authors' conclusion that, however the issue of the Ninth
Amendment's use might be resolved, "the Amendment must have more significance than an
inkblot" and quoting with approval Professor Barnett's conclusion that the Amendment
"'stands ready to respond to a crabbed construction that limits the scope of [constitutional]
protection to the enumerated rights").
13 One of these authors has thus asserted that "the Constitution is best understood ... as a
means of implementing the rights outlined in the Declaration." Stephen B. Presser, Book
Review, 14 CONST. COMMENT, 229, 232-33 (1997). See also id. at 233 (finding that the au-
thor "demolishes" a "positivistic approach" to construing the Constitution and provides
strong historical support for a "natural-rights based jurisprudence of the constitution"); id. at
235 (concurring in author's eschewing of "simple positivism").
14 One concern that his been linked to the Ninth Amendment is Edmund Pendleton's objec-
tion to a bill of rights that "in the progress of things, [we may] discover some great and im-
portant [right], which we don't now think of." Letter from Edmund Pendleton to Richard
Henry Lee (June 14, 1788), in 2 THE LETTERS AND PAPERS OF EDMtUND PENDLETON 1734-
1803, 530, 532-33 (David John Mays ed., 1967). See Sherry, supra note 10, at 1164 (also
quoting James Wilson on the idea that the law of nature is "immutable in its principles" but
"progressive in its operations and effects"). But the Federalist concern was at its heart posi-
tivist in nature. They were concerned that, based on the politics facing any effort to define
and adopt rights, "it might be impossible adequately to define those rights that would be
enumerated," and, moreover, "[a] definition that turned out to be too limited could become a
road map to circumvent and thereby defeat the right." Robert J. Reinstein, Completing the
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thors, then, the Ninth Amendment presents "a uniquely central text in any at-
tempt to take seriously the process of construing the Constitution."
15
An obvious source of appeal to the authors' position is the sense of depar-
ture from constitutionalism as it was originally conceived that many experience
as they study modem Supreme Court decisions construing the federal Constitu-
tion. The question worth confronting, however, is whether this sense of
departure derives from the failure of modem courts, and most especially the
United States Supreme Court, to share the founders' beliefs that there are fun-
damental natural rights and that these are constitutional rights. 
1 7
Almost a decade ago I suggested that some modem natural law constitu-
tionalists write as though modem legal positivists "have simply forgotten that
the framers of the Constitution and Bill of Rights were committed to the idea of
natural rights in the context of social contract political theory."'18 But modem
Constitution: The Declaration of Independence, Bill of Rights and Fourteenth Amendment,
66 TEMPLE L. REv. 361, 366-67 (1993). These concerns were addressed in the course of
drafting the federal Bill of Rights. Id. at 367-68. See also Thomas B. McAffee, The Origi-
nal Meaning of the Ninth Amendment, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 1215, 1276 n.232 (alternative
reading of Pendleton's argument).
15 Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Unreal Differences,
74 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 42 (1988), quoted in, KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 1387. For
a much more skeptical historical view that centers on the work of an individual, Harry A.
Jaffa, who has been characterized as "the dean of American historians who have underscored
the centrality of the connection between the Declaration of Independence and the Constitu-
tion." Patrick M. O'Neil, The Declaration as Un-constitution: The Bizarre Jurisprudential
Philosophy of Professor Harry V. Jaffa, 28 AKRON L. REv. 237 (1995). See Thomas B.
McAffee, Prolegomena to a Meaningful Debate of the Unwritten Constitution Thesis, 61 U.
CiN. L. REV. 107, 124 (1992).
16 See, e.g., Presser, supra note 13, at 233 (expressing sympathy with criticism of judges who
"made constitutional law according to their particular political preferences rather than fol-
lowing any valid constitutional philosophy").
17 It has been contended, for example, that a more positivistic version of our constitutional-
ism is demolished by a showing "that the only Justice to argue against a natural-rights based
jurisprudence of the constitution," Justice Iredell, not only contradicted the views of "his
contemporaries," but "abandoned his own clear views to the contrary voiced a scant few
years before." Presser, supra note 13, at 233, citing to, SCOTT DOUGLAS GERBER, To SECURE
THESE RIGHTS: THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION
111-112, 118-119 (1995). But Justice Iredell, the author of a well-known opinion limiting
constitutional rights to those found in the written constitution, had justified judicial review in
a private letter in which he contrasted America's written constitutions, with their implication
of a judicial enforcement power of the entire written constitution, with an extremely re-
stricted natural justice limitation on what he described as the "absolute power" held by Par-
liament. Iredell had, moreover, held a consistent view as a Supreme Court justice, see Helen
K. Michael, The Role of Natural Law in Early American Constitutionalism: Did the Foun-
ders Contemplate Judicial Enforcement of "Unwritten" Individual Rights, 69 N.C.L. REv.
421, 451-52 (1991), and had stated his view that state constitutions did not include implicit
rights in a 1788 speech before the North Carolina ratifying convention, just a year after writ-
ing the letter alluded to. See infra note 65 and accompanying text. See generally McAFEE,
supra note 10, at 63-65.
18 Thomas B. McAffee, The Bill of Rights, Social Contract Theory, and the Rights "Re-
tained" by the People, 16 S. ILL. U.L.J. 267, 271 (1992). I quickly added, however, that "if
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legal positivists 19 have long since acknowledged the centrality of the natural
rights views of the founding generation, and in fact the modem debate "is not
over whether it was a central end of the Constitution to secure natural rights,
but the relationship of such natural rights to the law of the Constitution."
20
A standard view at the time of the adoption of the Constitution was that "a
constitution does not in itself imply any more than a declaration of the relation
which the different parts of the government have to each other, but does not
imply security for the rights of individuals." 2 1 The drafters of the state consti-
tutions had "assumed that government had all power except for specific prohi-
bitions contained in a bill of rights." 22  When the federal Constitution was
transmitted to the states by Congress, Nathaniel Gorham of Massachusetts de-
fended the omission of a bill of rights based on the federal Constitution's
unique system of enumerated powers, explaining that "a bill of rights in state
governments was intended to retain certain power [in the people] as the legisla-
tures had unlimited powers. ' 23 An alternative understanding of the framers'
design, then, is to understand the Ninth Amendment as a federalism-based pro-
vision designed to clarify that the people had "retained" as rights not only the
limits on granted powers stated in the Bill of Rights, but also all they had not
granted as powers to the federal government.
24
In Part II, I set out the principle, found within the Declaration of Independ-
ence itself, that is so hard to reconcile with the idea of enforceable inalienable
rights - the power of the people to make decisions about their government, in-
any have forgotten this historical fact, their position is a straw man that need not detain us."
Id.
19 Legal Positivism "grounds the definition of law on the analytical separability of law and
morality," ANTHONY J. SEBOK, LEGAL POSITIVISM IN AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE 7 (1998),
but there is an unfortunate tendency to think "that positivism is somehow inherently
conservative." Id. This scholar agrees with the view that it is a mistake to think positivism
"offers reliable shelter to any political camp." Id.
20 McAffee, supra note 18, at 271. Giving the Declaration such a central place is recognized
as problematic even by a recent Jefferson biographer. Professor Maier notes that "the func-
tion of stating fundamental principles that established government had to respect was nor-
mally entrusted to declarations or bills of rights," and, moreover, such provisions could "be
enforced in the courts, which was not true of the Declaration of Independence." MAIER, su-
pra note 9, at 192.
21 Letters of Agrippa (Jan. 9, 1788), in THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 109 (Herbert Stor-
ing ed., 1981).
22 DONALD S. LuTz, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL 60 (1980). Accord, Philip
A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions 102 YALE L.J.
907, 930-55 (1993).
23 NATHANIEL GORHAM, 1 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 335 (Sept. 27, 1787) (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) [hereinafter RATIFICATION OF
THE CONSTITUTION].
24 Professer Akhil Reed Amar has accurately stated that "the federalism roots of the Ninth
Amendment, and its links to the unique enumerated powers strategy of Article I, help explain
why no previous state constitution featured language precisely like the Ninth's--a fact con-
veniently ignored by most mainstream accounts." AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 124 (1998).
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cluding what rights are to be preserved in their written Constitution. Part III
defends the alternative understanding of the Ninth Amendment as based on the
rights "retained" by the system of enumerated powers. Part IV shows how a
correct understanding of the Ninth Amendment fits in perfectly with the Con-
stitution's permissive treatment of the institution of human slavery. In Part V, I
attempt to offer a balanced assessment of our constitutional order and of Tho-
mas Jefferson's role in bringing it about.
II. NATURAL RIGHTS AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY
25
As noted above, these casebook authors consider it a significant question
.. ... 26
whether the written Constitution in effect incorporates the Declaration. But
one does not have to leave the Declaration to find the principle--government by
the "consent of the governed"-- that is difficult to reconcile perfectly and easily
with the idea that there are unwritten inalienable natural rights that are constitu-
tionally enforceable. A modem historian has claimed that "[t]he principle
enunciated in the Declaration of Independence that governments derive their
just powers from the 'consent of the governed' lies at the foundation of theA • ,,27
American republic. Most centrally, the idea was that the people held the ul-
timate power to create, alter, or destroy (when appropriate) the form of gov-• . 28
emnent under which they lived. An implication for the framers was that
"[a]s our constitutions are superior to our legislatures," the people "are superior
to our constitutions" and hence may "change the constitutions whenever and
however they please."2 9  The framers may have believed in inalienable rights,
but one of those inalienable rights was the power of the people to make funda-
mental decisions about their government, including the limits that should be
25 This section of this essay review is based on the second chapter of MCAFEE, supra note
10.
26 KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 135 (raising the question whether the written Constitu-
tion was intended to serve as a kind of "substitute for the Declaration").
27 Merrill Peterson, Thomas Jefferson, the Founders, and Constitutional Change, in THE
AMERICAN FOUNDING: ESSAYS ON THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 275, 276 (J. Jack-
son Barlow, Leonard W. Levy & Ken Masugi eds., 1988). For a sense of the direction one
might take this declaration, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitu-
tional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457 (1994).28 See Peterson, supra note 27, at 276; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN
REPUBLIC 1776-1787, 306-10 (1969); Himmelfarb, supra note 5, at 175-77, 181, 184-85.
There is a clear and obvious reason that this power of the people was viewed as being so
fundamental by Americans; it was the basis of their claimed authority to declare their inde-
pendence from England. MAIER, supra note 9, at 86-90. It was in that context that a county
in Maryland asserted that "the People have the indubitable right to reform or abolish a Gov-
ernment which may appear to them insufficient for the exigency of their affairs." Id. at 87,
(quoting VI AMERICAN ARCHIVES, 4 th Series, at 933 (Peter Force, ed., 1833-1846)). There is
little question that Americans saw themselves as involved in this same process when they
adopted the 1787 Constitution.
29 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 361-62 (Nov. 24, 1787).
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imposed on it.
30
Natural law at best speaks to only one dimension of the difficulty con-
fronted by constitutional designers.3 1  Even today constitutional framers must
consider not only the possibility of a moral reality, but also the imperfection of
the human beings that will implement their constitutional vision. It was Madi-
son, after all, who suggested that "[i]n framing a government which is to be
administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this: you must first
enable government to control the governed; and in the next place, oblige it to
control itself."32 It is, for example, easy to forget that in establishing natural
law-based adjudication, we do not establish natural law as our fundamental
law. 33 After all, the decisions will still be made by fallible human judges.
34
Though it is hardly a perfect solution, one traditional answer has been to rely
on a written constitution, by which we specify important elements of the sub-
stance of our commitment and command government to act accordingly.3 5 But
we are virtually as wary of granting essentially unlimited power to the judiciary
as we would be of granting such power to the other branches of government.
Political liberty during the early American period was thus associated, first
and foremost, with representative government, and the states' declarations of
rights were accordingly filled with communal rights, including provisions for
30 This is why Wilson could assert in the same speech that the right to make basic decisions
about government "is a right, of which no positive institution can ever deprive them." Id. at
362.
31 In the following section I lean on earlier analysis that can be found in Thomas B. McAffee,
Substance Above All: The Utopian Vision of Modern Natural Law Constitutionalists, 4 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 501, 514-15 (1995).
32 THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961 ).
33 The present casebook authors do not make this claim in as many words, but they come re-
markably close when they suggest that the most relevant question is whether "the vast body
of unenumerated common or natural law rights become judicially enforceable against the
Congress," and largely equate this issue with the question "whether the Constitution must be
construed in accordance with fundamental principle." KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at
152.
3 4 See, e.g., Philip Soper, Some Natural Confusions About Natural Law, 90 MICH. L. REv.
2393, 2413 (1992). He concludes that, under a system in which judges feel free to imple-
ment natural law, "the system remains positivist in the most significant sense, with the judge
simply serving as the sovereign in the place of the legislature." Id. at 2415. Professor
McConnell reminds us that our choice, after all, "is not between natural right and majori-
tarian rule. It is between one set of human institutions and another, none of which is infalli-
ble." Michael W. McConnell, A Moral Realist Defense of Constitutional Democracy, 64
Cmn.-KENT L. REv. 89, 96 (1988).
35 As James Cannon, a framer of the Pennsylvania Constitution, articulated the reason for
putting the Pennsylvania constitution in writing: "To deduce our rights from the principles
of equity, and justice, and the Constitution, is very well; but equity and justice are no de-
fense against power." WOOD, supra note 28, at 293 n. 56. For a treatment of why the peo-
ple who founded the American constitution relied upon the device of a written instrument,
and perceived in it both the key to implementing the ideal of self-government and to secur-
ing the rights of individuals, see MCAFEE, supra note 10, at 10-12.
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popular sovereignty, 36 officials' responsibility to the people,37 and provision
for the authority of the people to regulate the internal government and police of
the State. 38 The underlying philosophy of the early state constitutions was
summed up in the following provision in the Delaware constitution's declara-
tion of rights: "That the right of the people to participate in the Legislature, is
the best security of liberty."
39
In keeping with this philosophy, in 1776 the Massachusetts General Court
proclaimed that: "It is a Maxim, that, in every Government, there must exist
somewhere, a Supreme, Sovereign, absolute, and uncontrollable Power; But
this Power resides, always in the body of the People, and it never was, or can
be delegated, to one Man, or a few." Similarly, a provision in the Pennsyl-
vania Declaration of Rights asserted the community's "unalienable and inde-
feasible" right to reform or alter government "in such a manner as shall be by
that community judged most conducive to the public weal."'4 1 It was the gen-
36 The Virginia Declaration of Rights, which was drafted a month prior to adoption of the
Declaration of Independence, asserted "That all power is vested in, and consequently derived
from, the people." Va. Const. bill of rts., Sect. 2 (1776), reprinted in FRANCIS N. THORPE,
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS
OF THE STATE, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES, at 3082-83 (1909) [hereinafter STATE
CONSTITUTIONS]; N.C. Const., decl of rts., art. 1 (1776), id. at 2787.37E.g., Va. Const. bill of rts., sect. 2 (1776), STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36, at 3813
(providing that "magistrates are [the people's] trustees and servants, and at all times amena-
ble to them"); Pa. Const., decl. of rts., art. IV (1776), STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36,
at 3082 (similar formulation).38 E.g., Pa. Const., decl. of rts., art. III (1776), STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36, at 3082;
N.C. Const., decl. of rts., art. III (1776), reprinted in STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36,
at 2787.
39 Del. Const., decl. of rts., art. V, cited in, Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional
Provisions 1776-1791, in CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN THE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 69
n.80 (1987). To be sure, the thinking that eventuated in the adoption of the federal Constitu-
tion was increasingly less populist and democratic, and the American people associated to a
degree the move to increase protection of rights with a move toward a greater checking of
government and a less democratic system. But the basic idea that the people as a whole
needed to make the fundamental decisions about what form of government would yield them
the most satisfaction remained a critical part of the fundamental law philosophy of the
founding generation.
40 Massachusetts General Court, Proclamation of the General Court, Jan. 23, 1776, cited in,
WOOD, supra note 28, at 362. Similarly, in 1783 it was asserted that it was "in the people
alone 'that plenary power rests and abides which all agree should rest somewhere."' Hart-
ford Conn. Courant, Aug. 12, 1783, quoted in, WOOD, supra note 28, at 382. In 1788, the
federal Constitution was described as "[a] whole people exercising its first and greatest
power - performing an act of sovereignty, original, and unlimited." F. Hopkinson, Account
of the Grand Federal Procession 14 (1788), quoted in MICHAEL KAMMEN, SOVEREIGNTY
AND LIBERTY 23 (1988).
41 Pa. Const., decl. of rts., art. V (1776), STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36, at 3082.
Lawrence Leder observed that this political theory, emphasizing popular authority, had roots
in the colonial period and predated the revolutionary struggle. LAWRENCE H. LEDER,
LIBERTY AND AUTHORITY: EARLY AMERICAN POLITICAL IDEOLOGY, 1689-1763, 82 (1968)
(observing that the colonists believed that "if government failed to attain the ends for which
it was created, 'the compact is void,' as one spokesman put it, frustrationefinis, 'inasmuch
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eral view that "[t]he community, however represented, ought to remain the su-
preme authority and ultimate judicature."' 42
The move to reduce rights to positive form undoubtedly contributed to the
tendency to equate constitutionalism with written limitations on government,
particularly as Americans pondered the consequences of failing to have needed
limitations put into writing. Indeed, this is one of the "lessons" they took from
their revolutionary experience. Now that they were on the other side of the de-
cision for Revolution, Americans came to see the British constitution through
new eyes and in decidedly realistic terms. Accordingly, thoughtful Americans
saw the British constitution's flexibility and mutability (the qualities they had
so recently insisted that it lacked) as embodying the very antithesis of a true
constitution--one that fixes basically immutable limitations on government
power.4 3 If the absence of effective checks on power could yield a system of
positive law that violated the norms of tradition and natural law with impunity,
including norms deemed fundamental by the political order itself, it follows
that although unwritten natural law provides a standard for judging positive
law, it does not invariably have the status of positive law in a given legal sys-
tem.
44
as the people always reserve a right to alter the contract as warranted"). For a useful review
of the founding period's emphasis on the authority of the people, see Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1436-39 (1987).
42 WOOD, supra note 28, at 382; LEDER, supra note 41, at 57 (quoting 1750's letter to a Bos-
ton Weekly newsletter asserting that the people "have an undoubted right to judge for them-
selves whether that power is improved to good purposes or not").
43 Herman Belz, Constitutionalism and the American Founding, in THE FRAMING AND
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 333, 337 (Leonard Levy & Dennis Mahoney eds.,
1987); Gordon S. Wood, The Political Ideology of the Founders, in TOWARD A MORE
PERFECT UNION 7, 23 (Neill York ed., 1988). The revolutionary, Tom Paine, would write:
"From the want of a Constitution in England to restrain and regulate the wild impulse of
power, many of the laws are irrational and tyrannical, and the administration of them vague
and problematical." Thomas Paine, Rights of Man, in THE SELECTED WORK OF TOM PAINE
218 (H. Fast ed. 1945). See also THE FEDERALIST NO. 53, at 359-61 (James Madison) (Jacob
E. Cooke ed., 1961) (noting that the distinction "between a constitution established by the
people, and unalterable by the government" and "a law established by the government," has
not been understood elsewhere, and that Parliament is viewed as "uncontrollable" even by
the constitution); Philodemus [Thomas Tudor Tucker], Conciliatory Hints, Attempting, by a
Fair State of Matters, to Remove Party Prejudice, in 1 AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING
DURING THE FOUNDING ERA 1760-1805, 606, 610 (Charles Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds.,
1983) (describing British system as granting Parliament "undefinable privileges, transcen-
dent power, and political omnipotence").
44 Thus Madison, in drafting the Bill of Rights, proceeded with caution, concluding that pro-
visions of a "controvertible nature ought not to be hazarded," inasmuch as "two or three con-
tentious additions would even now prostrate the whole project." Letter from James Madison
to John Pendleton, in 5 WRrINGS OF JAMES MADISON 405-06 (G. Hunt ed. 1904), cited in
Nichol, supra note 3, at 1312. See also Thomas B. McAffee & Michael J. Quinlan, Bringing
Forward the Right to Keep and Bear Arms: Do Text, History, or Precedent Stand in the
Way?, 75 N.C.L. REV. 781, 832-33 (1997) (Bill of Rights adoption reflected Federalist un-
willingness to accept changes that affected "the structure and stamina" of the proposed gov-
ernment, but willingness to accept individual rights limitations "which are important in the
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The written constitution, moreover, was viewed as the memorialization of
the contract between the government and the governed, and the powers held by
government were viewed as grants from the people. Given that the state gov-
ernments were governments with general legislative powers, the presumption
was that the people parted with all the power they did not expressly reserve. As
noted above, the drafters of these state constitutions "assumed that government
had all power except for specific prohibitions contained in a bill of rights."
45
Thus even though there are "inherent rights pertaining to all mankind in a state
of natural liberty," and government is instituted to provide greater security to
these rights, it nevertheless follows from the universal nature of the grant of
powers to a general legislature that such legislative powers will, in the absence
of express reservations, "include every power of acting, and every claim of
possessing or obtaining any thing." 46 Consequently there is a strict necessity to
have "an express stipulation for all such rights as are intended to be exempted
from the civil authority."
'4 7
These assumptions about the need to limit legislative authority in the writ-
ten constitution are reflected, moreover, in the various states' debates surround-
ing particular provisions of their declarations of rights. In Virginia, for exam-
ple, Patrick Henry successfully opposed the inclusion of a ban on legislative
criminal trials, in the form of bills of attainder, in Virginia's declaration of
rights. According to one account, Henry presented "a terrifying picture of
some towering public offender, against whom ordinary laws would be impo-
eyes of many and can be objectionable in those of none").4 5 LUTZ, supra note 22, at 60. See also 1 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23,
at 335, (bills of rights were "intended to retain certain powers [in the people] as the legisla-
tures had unlimited powers"); James Wilson, 13 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
23, at 391 (Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Nov. 28, 1787) (contending that a bill of
rights "would have been improperly annexed to the federal plan, and for this plain reason,
that it would imply that whatever is not expressed was given [as in the state constitutions],
which is not the principle of the proposed Constitution"); McAFEE, supra note 10, at 133-34.
46 Essays by The Impartial Examiner (Virginia Independent Chronicle February-June 1788)
(Feb, 20, 1788), in 5 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 172, 177 (Herbert J. Storing ed.,
1981) (Feb, 20,1788)[hereinafter The Impartial Examiner]. This is why it is an extremely
orthodox view, from an originalist standpoint, to suggest that the Constitution "may have its
own theory ofjustice," and to suggest further that "it is that theory which is to govern" rather
than a system of ideal justice that might be apprehended by the Constitution's interpreter.
William Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution: Part I1 Antinomial Choices and
the Role of the Supreme Court (Part 2), 72 IOWA L. REV. 1281, 1289 (1987).
47 The Impartial Examiner, supra note 46, at 177. The prescription became clear. The peo-
ple must insist upon a bill of rights, and then they "ought to give up no greater share [of the
mass of natural rights] than what is understood to be absolutely necessary." Id. at 176. De-
spite his clearcut positivism, the present casebook authors cite the "Impartial Examiner" only
for the proposition that a purpose of government is "to secure... natural rights." KMIEC &
PRESSER, supra note 1, at 133. Even though they acknowledge that the Examiner com-
plained that "the proposed union would not guarantee the unalienable natural rights of indi-
viduals," id., they fail to admit that his reading conflicts with an inherent rights reading of
the Constitution and is irreconcilable with their understanding of the Ninth Amendment.
[Vol. 1:138
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
tent."48 This victory was won even though legislative trials for criminal con-
duct quite obviously undermined traditional common law guarantees relating to
due process and fair trials, most especially the right to trial by jury. In addition,
to the extent that traditional due process guarantees, especially the fundamen-
tals of notice and hearing, were also viewed as civil guarantees of natural
rights--the most fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property--a bill of at-
tainder could be called an invasion of an individual's natural rights.4 9 Consid-
ering that England had bills of attainder, those considering the proposed ban on
bills of attainder would have assumed that the Virginia assembly would hold
such a power in the absence of the prohibition. "And subsequently Virginia
actually enacted a bill of attainder against an unpopular Tory at the instigation
of Governor Patrick Henry."
51
This need to put limits on legislative authority expressly in writing is re-
flected as well in the "natural equality" principle declared in the 1776 Virginia
Declaration of Rights. Fearing that under the proposed statement, recognizing
equal rights, slavery would be viewed as an unconstitutional infringement of
"natural equality," the provision was amended to state that all men are "by
nature free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when
they enter into society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest their
posterity."' 53 (The changed language is italicized.) As Warren Billings ob-
serves, the language inserted into the provision under consideration was in-
cluded precisely in order to clarify that the fundamental rights that people retain
as they enter civil society did not apply to the Black race because the slaves had
48 Edmund Randolph, Essay on the Revolutionary History of Virginia, reprinted in 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 249 (1971).
49 Thus Professor Sherry contends that the founding generation perceived at least the prohibi-
tion on ex post facto laws as a guarantee protecting a natural right that would have been
deemed implicit in the state constitutions if the limitation were not stated explicitly in a
state's declaration of rights. Sherry, supra note 10, at 1157. She contends that this is the
reason some at the Philadelphia Convention opposed inclusion of such a prohibition in the
proposed federal Constitution as unnecessary. Id.5 0Sherry contends that the prohibition on bills of attainder was viewed as a "positive right,"
rather than a natural right, so that a written guarantee was required so as to exclude legisla-
tive trials as a weapon that constitutionally could be employed. Id. See also KMIEC &
PRESSER, supra note 1, at 139-41. But Madison viewed bills of attainder in the same light as
ex post facto laws, with both of them being "contrary to the first principles of the social
compact, and to every principle of sound legislation." THE FEDERALIST No. 44 , at 301
[(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).] The written constitution does not purport to
place these limitations on different constitutional grounds; nor does it suggest that one of
these rights could be eliminated by amendment, but the other could not.
51 McAffee, supra note 18, at 294.
52 See generally Warren M. Billings, "That All Men are Born Equally Free and Independ-
ent": Virginians and the Origins of the Bill of Rights, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE
STATES 335, 339-40 (Patrick T.J. Conley & John P. Kaminski, eds., 1992).
53 Va. Const., decl. of rts., Sect. 1, reprinted in STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36, at 3813
(emphasis added).
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never entered into a state of civil society in Virginia. 54 This Virginia example
is especially compelling since it (1) assuredly dealt with a quintessential natural
right, and (2) presumed that constitution-makers were empowered to determine
the scope of constitutional limits on legislative powers - including limits rooted
in principles of natural right. This second point pervaded the debate over the
federal Constitution that would occur eleven years later.
55
The need for express limits on legislative power was recognized even as to
the proposed federal Constitution. Even though the federal government held
only the powers specifically granted to it, it was presumed that it also held the
powers that logically fell within the grants of power delegated. The Constitu-
tion's opponents, for example, assumed that since Congress was granted power
to establish federal courts, it could establish the procedures to be followed in
those courts, and there was thus a need for a constitutional guarantee of juries
in civil cases. 56 Rather than claiming that such a right was implied, defenders
of the Constitution argued that "[t]he Representatives of the people may be
safely trusted in this matter."'57 So the Constitution's defenders relied on tradi-
tional ideas of "popular control" of legislatures as much as on limits to power
thought to be based on the scheme of enumerated powers. So when the author
of Virginia's declaration of rights, George Mason, contended at the Philadel-
phia Convention that "[t]he Laws of the U.S. are to be paramount to State Bills
of Rights," 58 there was no meaningful response, but delegates voted against in-
54 Billings, supra note 52, at 339-40. As a Jefferson biographer notes, "at least it freed the
state of Virginia from an obligation to recognize and protect the inherent rights of slaves"
since it was clear that they "had never entered Virginia's society, which was confined to
whites." MAIER, supra note 9, at 193. See also Pauline Maier, The Strange History of"All
Men Are Created Equal", 56 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 873, 881 (1999) (noting that Virginia
amended Mason's draft of the state's declaration of rights "so it imposed no obligation on
the state to honor and protect the rights of enslaved blacks").
55 Here the doctrine of popular sovereignty worked as a key to limiting the powers granted to
government. Constitutional conventions, which gradually became the norm, "gave institu-
tional reality to the theoretical ideal that governmental authority should rest on a constitution
that proceeded directly from the people and that took precedence over ordinary legislation."
Thomas C. Grey, The Original Understanding and the Unwritten Constitution, in TOWARD A
MORE PERFECT UNION: Six ESSAYS ON THE CONSTITUTION 145, 155 (Neil L. York ed., 1988)
[hereinafter Grey].56 KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 141 (excerpting speech by Mr. Williamson arguing that
"no provision was yet made for juries in Civil cases and suggesting the necessity of it").571d. See also id. at 142 (argument by Representative Roger Sherman that "[tihe Legislature
may be safely trusted"). Alexander Hamilton took this sort of argument to its logical ex-
treme:
The best judges of the matter will be the least anxious for a constitutional establishment of
the trial by jury in civil cases, and will be the most ready to admit that the changes which are
continually happening in the affairs of society, may render a different mode of determining
questions of property, preferable in many cases, in which that mode of trial now prevails ....
I suspect it to be impossible in the nature of the thing, to fix the salutary point at which the
operation of the institution ought to stop, and this is with me a strong argument for leaving
the matter to the discretion of the legislature.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, at 573 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
58 KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 142.
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59
elusion of the proposed Bill of Rights.
While the declarations of rights were undoubtedly thought to state funda-
mental principles of government that ought to be honored perpetually, nothing
in them reflects a founding-era consensus limiting the power of the people to
decide the fundamental questions about government by altering their constitu-
tions. As we have noted, the people's power to alter and reform their gov-
ernments were among the fundamentals set forth in a number of Declarations of
Rights. 6 1 While the idea of perpetual constitutions dominated the framing of
both the declarations and the frames of government, 62 so that, for example
most of the early state constitutions created no mechanism for amendment,6J
59 And the omission in particular of a guarantee of the right to trial by jury in civil cases was
one of the most oft-cited objections to the proposed Constitution. See Thomas B. McAffee,
The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understandings, Modern Misreadings, 43
VILL. L. REv. 17, 105 n.328 (1998). Indeed, advocates of inherent constitutional rights have
contended that the right to trial by jury in civil cases was intended to be an implicit limit on
federal powers. See, e.g., Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The "Proper" Scope of Fed-
eral Power: A Jurisdictional Reading of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267, 320-21
(1993) ("Congress, under the original Constitution, could not abolish jury trials in civil cases
.... "); Sherry, supra note 10, at 1138-40, 1146. But see MCAFEE, supra note 10, at 104-
110 (indicating the right to civil juries was purposefully omitted, and Federalist arguments
did not claim that it was in fact a constitutional right).601n the minds of the founding generation, this was simply a matter of putting first things
first. It was the people who held all power. As James Wilson said: "In all governments,
whatever is their form, however they may be constituted, there must be a power established
from which there is no appeal and which is therefore called absolute, supreme, and uncon-
trollable." 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 348 (Pennsylvania Rati-
fying Convention, Nov. 24, 1787). Wilson concluded that this sovereignty "is a power
paramount to every constitution, inalienable in its nature, and indefinite in its extent." Id. at
349. A consequence is "that the people may change the constitutions whenever and however
they please." Id. at 362. This is not only their right, but it is one of "which no positive insti-
tution can ever deprive them." Id. (Talk about inalienable rights.)
61 Goldstein states that eight of the fourteen state constitutions adopted between 1776 and
1780 included paraphrases of the notion of the people's right to "alter or abolish" their
"form" of government. LESLIE FRIEDMAN GOLDSTEIN, IN DEFENSE OF THE TEXT: DEMOCRACY
AND CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 73-74 (1991).
62 If the only relevant question were really "whether the Constitution must be construed in
accordance with fundamental principle," KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 152, it really
would follow from an affirmative response, the one supplied by these casebook authors, that
the Ninth Amendment is properly read as prohibiting constitutional amendments that violate
inalienable natural rights. E.g., Jeff Rosen, Was the Flag Burning Amendment Unconstitu-
tional?, 100 YALE L.J. 1073 (1991). But if our commitment to judicial review is strong
enough to warrant trusting courts to make the judgments called for, even if in theory it
means they have authority to impose some strange-sounding rights, it is not clear why the
people are not to be entrusted to make analogous judgments in determining the rights
deemed to be sufficiently fundamental to warrant constitutional protection. This is just one
reason, among many, to reject the unenumerated rights construction (permitting courts to
discover new affirmative limits on government authority) of the Ninth Amendment--it is a
construction that opens the door to courts overruling the judgments of the sovereign people.
63 See, e.g., DONALD S. LUTz, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 105 (1988)
(observing that only four of the first eleven state constitutions made explicit provision for
amendment).
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there is no reason to think that in general this implied any limitation on the
power of the people to alter and reform their government according to their
will.
64
There is no question that the framers believed in inalienable natural rights.
But at least as fundamental is that they believed that the authority of the people
to make decisions about government was among the rights properly deemed
inalienable. At the center of the constitutional project for those involved in
drafting and ratifying the Constitution was that it was an experiment in collec-
tive self-government. If the Declaration of Independence stated the principle
that animated those who gathered in Philadelphia, it was in asserting that the
legitimacy of government stems from the consent of the governed. As the au-
thority of the people became more central, however, it necessarily meant that
the importance of the written constitution where their decisions were embodied
would grow as well.
III. THE RIGHTS "RETAINED" BY THE NINTH AMENDMENT
If the adoption of the Ninth Amendment concerned a fear of losing rights
omitted from an ostensibly thorough enumeration, it would have made as much• • 65
sense being applied to the bills of rights that existed in the state constitutions.
64 Andrew McLaughlin long ago argued that the failure to provide for amendment probably
reflected haste and the failure to pause to consider that there would be such a need. ANDREW
C. MCLAUGHLIN, THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, AND PARTIES 115 (Da Capo Press 1972).
McLaughlin's insight seems confirmed by the provision for amendment in most of the sec-
ond wave of constitutions, enacted from 1777 to 1786. LUTZ, supra note 63, at 105. I have
seen no evidence of fundamental objections being raised to any of these constitutions provid-
ing for amendment, nor any evidence that the power of amendment was conceived to be lim-
ited to provisions not dealing with natural rights.
65 Of course, the limits on government found in the federal Bill of Rights were not viewed
historically as having any application to state governments. E.g., Barron v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833); KMIEC & PRESSER, supra note 1, at 725 (finding "little
doubt" that "the Court is correct on this point, as a glance at any of the better histories of the
period will confirm"). But if these authors have correctly read the Ninth Amendment as the
people retaining to themselves inalienable natural rights, they at least owe readers an expla-
nation why it limits only the national government, since it apparently is a decision to "vest
these rights in the people, rather than in any government." Calvin R. Massey, Federalism
and Fundamental Rights: The Ninth Amendment, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY THE PEOPLE:
THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF THE NINTH AMENDMENT 291, 335 (Randy E. Barnett ed.,
1989) [hereinafter THE RIGHTS RETAINED]. There is a substantial group of legal scholars
who have read the Ninth Amendment as applying by its own terms to limiting the powers of
the states. E.g., Charles Black, Jr., "One Nation Indivisible": Unnamed Human Rights in the
States, 65 ST. JoHN'S L. REv. 17, 29 (1991); Bennett B. Patterson, The Forgotten Ninth
Amendment, in THE RIGHTS RETAINED, supra, at 107, 114-20; Norman G. Redlich, "Are
There Certain Rights... Retained by the People?", 37 N.Y.U. L. REv. 787, 805-806 (1962).
If the rights "retained" by the people are appropriately thought to be essentially the same as
the "powers" reserved "to the people," as suggested in Nichol, supra note 3, at 1312, and
Redlich, supra, at 806, logically it would be difficult to contend that they only limit one level
of government.
If the Ninth Amendment is read as limiting state governments, however, the wedge be-
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If the danger to rights stemmed from the mere possibility of being omitted, that
danger would apply in each case of a bill of rights, since there is always the risk
that a right worthy of legal security could be omitted.6 6  But if anything is
clear, the Federalist proponents of these arguments believed that they were lim-
ited to the constitutional scheme embodied in the federal constitution. 6 7 One of
the spokesmen favoring adoption of the Constitution, James Wilson, tracked
the general understanding of the state constitutions, outlined above,68 when he
observed that under them the people had "invested their representatives with
every right and authority which they did not in explicit terms reserve."'69 By
contrast, under the federal Constitution, "the reverse of the proposition prevails,
and everything which is not given, is reserved."70 Federalist proponents of the
unamended Constitution feared that the inference in favor of the people's
rights, an inference that grew in their minds from the federal system of enumer-
ated powers combined with a general reservation of rights (the reservation of
all not granted as powers), 7 1 would be reversed if the system of enumerated
powers were replaced with an attempt to set out the rights of the people. 72 This
tween this view of the Constitution and the views of Thomas Jefferson becomes an un-
bridgeable gulf. In 1819 and 1820, the nation experienced the crisis of the Missouri Com-
promise. In the midst of this crisis, it was clear to Jefferson that the threatened rejection of
Missouri's bid for statehood unless it abandoned its slave system or opened its borders to
free blacks represented a violation of the original federal bargain and threatened to under-
mine Missouri's sovereign power to determine its own domestic affairs. MAIER, supra note
9, at 185. Even if Jefferson was a "natural rights" thinker, there is little doubt that he was
also a "states' rights" thinker, and he would have put states' rights ahead of natural rights in
the context of seeking to resolve the central constitutional issue of his day.
66 And, indeed as we have seen, the Federalists exerted great energy to distinguish the pro-
posed federal Constitution from the constitutions that existed within the states. See supra
notes 43-45 and accompanying text. State legislatures even today are viewed as possessing
all governmental power not ceded to the national government so that "a state constitution
does not grant governmental power but merely structures and limits it." G. ALAN TARR AND
MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN THE NATION 50 (1988).
67Reinstein accurately perceives that, according to those who defended the Constitution,
since " [s]overeignty remained with the people, and the government had only those powers
delegated to it," Reinstein, supra note 14, at 366, the people's rights were "secured by the
structure of the new government and not by an enumeration of rights." Id.68 See supra notes 39-45 and accompanying text.
69 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 167 (Speech in the State House
Yard, Oct. 6, 1787). See generally McAffee, supra note 14, at 1230 n.58.
70 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 167-68. See generally McAffee,
supra note 14, at 1231 n.59.
71 One of the keys to understanding this debate is to realize that "[tihe best way to protect
civil liberty, Madison believed, was by imposing structural limits on power such as those the
Philadelphia convention had built into the federal Constitution." MAIER, supra note 9, at
196.72 This is why Wilson would argue that a proposal to adopt a measure "that would have sup-
posed that we were throwing into the general government every power not expressly re-
served by the people would have been spurned at, in that house [the federal convention],
with the greatest indignation." 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 23, at 387-
88. Wilson apparently believed that the adoption of a federal Bill of Rights would turn the
federal government of specific, enumerated powers into a government of essentially unlim-
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is precisely why Madison could argue that the unamended Constitution pro-
vides that "every thing not granted is reserved," but could also contend that "
[i]f an enumeration be made of our rights" it will be "implied that every thing
omitted is given to the general government.,
73
This entire line of analysis could not have been set forth more clearly than
it was by James Iredell in North Carolina. He stated:
If we had formed a general legislature, with undefined powers, a bill of rights
would not only have been proper, but necessary; and it would have then oper-
ated as an exception to the legislative authority in such particulars. It has this
effect in respect to some of the American constitutions, where the powers of
legislation are general. But where they are powers of a particular nature, and
expressly defined, as in the case of the [federal] Constitution before us, I
think, for the reasons I have given, a bill of right is not only unnecessary, but
would be absurd and dangerous.74
The distinction between governments of general legislative powers, as ex-
isted in the states, and governments of enumerated powers, as was embodied in
the federal government, was the distinction that drove the entire Bill of Rights
debate. 75 This is why Wilson could argue: "[W]hen general legislative powers
are given, then the people part with their authority, and, on the gentleman's
ited powers subject only to the limitations imposed in favor of particular rights.
73 Madison's Report, in 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions, on the Adoption of
the Federal Constitution, As Recommended by the General Convention at Philadelphia in
1787, at 620 (June 24, 1788) (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 186996) [hereinafter Elliot's De-
bates].74 Address to the North Carolina Ratifying Convention (July 28, 1788), in 4 Elliot's Debates,
supra note 73, at 149 (North Carolina Ratifying Convention, July 28, 1788). See also Ed-
mund Randolph's address to the Virginia Ratifying Convention (June 15, 1788), in, 3 El-
liot's Debates, supra note 73, at 467 (Virginia Ratifying Convention, June 15, 1788). One of
the most disappointing experiences I've had was to attend a colloquium on the Ninth
Amendment and have an experienced legal scholar examine the above statement by James
Iredell with me, only to have him express the view that it had little relevance to understand-
ing the case eventually made for the adoption of the Ninth Amendment.
75 A few weeks after the Constitutional Convention, James Wilson explained that under the
state constitutions the people had "invested their representatives with every right and author-
ity which they did not in explicit terms reserve," James Wilson, Speech in the State House
Yard, Pa. Herald, Oct. 9, 1787, reprinted in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra
note 23, at 167-68. See George Nicholas, Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth
of Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (June 14, 1788), in 3 Elliot's De-
bates, supra note 73, at 449, 450 (contrasting case of Virginia, where "all powers were given
to the government without any exception," with "the general government, to which certain
special powers were delegated for certain purposes"); Edmund Randolph, Debates in the
Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution
(June 5, 1788), in 3 Elliot's Debates, supra note 73, at 463, 467 (distinguishing state legisla-
tures that have "no limitation to their powers" from legislature "with certain delineated pow-
ers" and contending that while bill of rights is "necessary in the former, it would not be in
the latter" because "the best security that can be in the latter is the express enumeration of its
powers"). The pervasive antifederalist fears that their rights were forfeited by the proposed
Constitution indicates that traditional and natural rights did not in general hold the status of
well-established jurisdictional limitations in a legal sense--a fact that cuts sharply against an
implied rights reading of the Ninth Amendment.
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principle of government, retain nothing. But in a government like the proposed
one, there can be no necessity for a bill of rights. For, on my principle, the
people never part with their power." 76 The Ninth Amendment was included to
clarify that the people retained all they had not granted to the national govern-
ment, to prevent an undercutting of the limited powers scheme; it was not in-
cluded to create a method for judicial imposition of unwritten rights.
IV. JEFFERSON AND THE INSTITUTION OF HUMAN SLAVERY
Historically, it is clear that there was contradiction between the concept of
human equality articulated in Jefferson's Declaration and the institution of hu-
man slavery. We have already seen that in the very year that Jefferson
drafted his Declaration, and indeed in the very state, members of the Virginia
state constitutional convention struggled with the difficulty of asserting equal
claims to fundamental natural rights without calling the legitimacy (and consti-
tutionality) of slavery into doubt. 78  Their "solution," as detailed in Part II
above, was to change the constitutional text to clarify that African slaves had
not entered into civil society. It was as though this "positive law" change could
rescue them from their problem with the natural or moral law (which they as-
serted was the basis of the declared independence).
But this was no temporary adjustment uniquely related to the revolution or
the decision to declare independence. A careful student of the constitutional
history has concluded that "[t]he Founders deliberately omitted the Declara-
tion's doctrine of equal rights from the Bill of Rights, not because the doctrine
was considered mere rhetoric, but because its inclusion in the Constitution
would have been dangerous to the continued existence of slavery.'"79 There is
76 James Wilson, 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONsTrrTUTION, supra note 23, at 470 (Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention, Dec. 4, 1787). Elsewhere Wilson clarified his point: "In short, sir, I
have said that a bill of rights would have been improperly annexed to the federal plan, and
for this plain reason, that it would imply that whatever is not expressed was given, which is
not the principle of the proposed Constitution." Id. at 391 (Pennsylvania Ratifying Conven-
tion, Nov. 28, 1787). Little wonder that Wilson uniformly limited his statements about the
danger of inserting a bill of rights in the proposed Constitution to "a government possessed
of enumerated powers." Id. at 388 (Nov. 28, 1787).
77 It was difficult not to see that "the same argument that denied kings an inherited right to
rule denied the right of masters to own slaves whose status was determined by birth, not con-
sent." MAIER, supra note 9, at 198. Although the Declaration started with the proposition
that "we are all equal in the sight of God," it is clear in the year 2000 that, as President
Ronald Reagan put it, "as Americans that is not enough--we must be equal in the eyes of
each other." Gordon S. Wood, Thomas Jefferson, Equality, and the Creation of a Civil Soci-
ety, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2133, 2137 (1996). At the least, the Declaration proclaims "the
obligation of government to accord equal legal status to all individuals, to confer upon all the
same rights, and to impose on all the same duties." Paul D. Carrington, Remembering Jeffer-
son, 2 WILLIAM & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 455, 463 (1993).78 See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text. For additional useful commentary on this
course of events, see Reinstein, supra note 14, at 370-71.
79 Reinstein, supra note 14, at 362-63. There is little question that this decision reflected ear-
lier determinations not to confront slave states as to their decision to permit chattel slavery
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no question that the framers of the Constitution who were philosophically op-
posed to slavery saw compromises in drafting the Constitution to accommodate
the institution as critical to preserving the union. As early as 1788, George
Mason drafted a proposed federal Bill of Rights that omitted the most trouble-
some equal rights language and conditioned protection of specified rights to
"freemen" only. 8 1 Madison did not go quite this far, but omitted from his draft
Bill of Rights specific reference to natural rights. 82 Although it has been sug-
gested by Dean Reinstein that Madison's language reflected "scruples" against
using the term "slave" or "freeman" in constitutional text,83 as it well might
have, it is no coincidence that Madison's proposal was to be a prefix to the
Constitution, and omitted the "harder" language of command and prohibition
that could create legal limits on government. R The very fact that Madison
chose to draft this language in the "softer" format that had characterized state
declarations, despite the marked trend in another direction, is suggestive that he
was seeking to avoid legally undermining slavery even while paying appropri-
within their borders. See, e.g., PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY,
FEDERALISM, AND COMITY 23 (The Lawbook Exchange, Ltd. 2000) (1981) (slave state repre-
sentatives obtained "power and protection for slavery" at Philadelphia convention); Earl M.
Maltz, Slavery, Federalism, and the Structure of the Constitution, 36 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
466, 468 (1992) (considering that the Constitution was designed to preserve slavery, "[n]one
but a handful of the most radical abolitionists ... believed that the Constitution by its terms
abolished slavery, or that the federal government possessed the power to outlaw slavery in
existing states"). "It is, of course, difficult to convey the horror of this chapter of American
life." Nichol, supra note 3, at 1326 n.126.
80 See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 24, 1787), in 10 THE
PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 206-19 (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1977), cited in Reinstein,
supra note 14, at 374. Even in his Inaugural Address, President Washington suggested that
the proposed federal Bill of Rights ought to show "a reverence for the characteristic rights
of freemen, and a regard for the public harmony." 2 PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 176
(W. W. Abbot ed., 1987) (emphasis added).
81 Reinstein, supra note 14, at 372. The cautiousness that characterized the federal Bill of
Rights is reflected in part in federalism concerns that went beyond protecting the institution
of slavery. The federal Bill of Rights was "a lean summary of restrictions on the federal
government, tacked onto the end of the Constitution like the afterthought it was." MAIER,
supra note 9, at 194.
82 The Virginia provision had read:
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of
which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive or divest
their posterity; namely, the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and
possessing property, and pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
Va. Const. bill of rts., sect. 1, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 36, at 3813.
Madison proposed the following language to be included in a new "prefix" to the Constitu-
tion:
That government is instituted, and ought to be exercised for the benefit of the people; which
consists in the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right of acquiring and using property,
and generally of pursuing and obtaining happiness and safety.
Madison Resolution (June 8, 1789), reprinted in Creating the Bill of Rights: The Documen-
tary History From the First Federal Congress 11 (Helen E. Veit et al. eds., 1991).
83 Reinstein, supra note 14, at 373.
84See McAffee, supra note 18, at 302-05.
[Vol. 1:138
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION
ate lip service to the basic principle of equal rights.
85
In 1806, the Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, in an opinion drafted by
Judge St. George Tucker, held that slavery was unaffected by the 1776 Virginia
Declaration of Rights, reversing a decision by Chancellor George Wythe.
86
Over time, "[t]his became the judicial response to the Declaration of Independ-
ence and its constitutional embodiments."87 Only the many years of the aboli-
tionist movement, with its work on the nation's ideology, and the success of the
North in the Civil War, would prepare the nation to accept the fundamental
changes that were at least anticipated by the Declaration of Independence.
88
V. CONCLUSION
There is no question that Thomas Jefferson figures prominently in the na-
tion's early history, and especially in declaring independence and bringing
85 Professor Maier observes that it is possible that Madison and others perceived that the
Declaration principles "might impede the foundation of a stable, effective national govern-
ment." MAIER, supra note 9, at 195. But "[p]erhaps, too, Madison feared alienating the sup-
port of slaveholders," and so he acquiesced in rejection even of his "pared-down version of
the Virginia Declaration of Rights." Id. See also Maier, supra note 54, at 881 (arguing that
"Madison's 'prefix' was probably designed in part to calm antifederalists without provoking
the opposition of slave holders," but concluding that "Congress instead eliminated the 'pre-
fix' altogether"). It is so clear that the Constitution was not intended to prohibit slavery that
even a leading advocate of the unenumerated, natural rights reading of the Ninth Amend-
ment frankly admits that the founders were "authorizing slavery." Grey, supra note 55, at
164. See also Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 183 n.64
(1992) (acknowledging that "neither the Supreme Court nor most state courts used principles
of natural justice to abolish slavery," but contending that the "extreme political sensitivity"
of the issue renders "that issue unrepresentative of their treatment of natural law generally").
While Sherry accurately observes that for some slavery represented "a conflict between two
natural rights," id., rather than an opportunity to choose between natural and positive law,
there can be little question that for Jefferson, Madison and other leading proponents of the
Constitution, acceptance of the Constitution's compromise on slavery required acceptance of
slavery as positive law. See also Carrington, supra note 77, at 464 (observing that "[i]t was
indeed widely recognized, even in the South, that the concept of individual equality before
the law could not be reconciled with the idea of some men owning other men").
86 Reinstein, supra note 14, at 376. Wythe's role in this story has an ironic quality, inasmuch
as Professor Carrington has pointed out it was Wythe, a former law teacher of Jefferson's,
who was the influence for substituting the "pursuit of happiness" for "property" in the Decla-
ration of Independence "so that all might understand that the new nation did not intend to
preserve the institution of chattel slavery." Carrington, supra note 77, at 464.
87 Reinstein, supra note 14, at 377. None of this is to say that in the early years there was an
acute consciousness of a conflict between the sentiments Jefferson expressed and the institu-
tion of slavery. In none of the documents that spoke to the same or similar issues "is there
any evidence whatsoever that the Declaration of Independence lived in men's minds as a
classic statement of American political principles." MAIER, supra note 9, at 167. For exam-
ple, "[n]ot one revolutionary state bill of rights used the words 'all men are created equal."'
Id.
88 See generally Reinstein, supra note 14, at 383-410. Indeed, Jefferson himself acknowl-
edged the terrible dilemma that slavery presented the nation. "Indeed," he said, "I tremble
for my country when I reflect that God is just; that his justice cannot sleep forever." Nichol,
supra note 3, at 1326 n.126.
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forth the Bill of Rights.89 And his Declaration of Independence brilliantly for-
mulated the American position that government's legitimacy depended partly
on whether it was adequate to the task of securing and protecting mankind's
basic equality before the law. There can also be no doubt that the founding
generation saw it as a central purpose of a constitution to secure the natural
rights for all free Americans; indeed, a genuine controversy arose as to whether
the proposed federal Constitution would adequately secure those rights or
would have the effect of granting them away.91 But the debate was significant,
precisely because the framers of the Constitution believed that drafting of their
written Constitution would determine whether the rights would be protected or
not.
The founders disagreed as to whether the proposed Constitution was ade-
quately designed to secure the people's rights, but there was not a widespread
thought that the rights would be protected simply because they were in fact
moral entitlements, this was a republican government, 92 or the people were
89 It is hard to disagree with Professor Carrington, who asserts that "Abraham Lincoln was
not wrong to conclude that, based up the impact of the Declaration, Mr. Jefferson is the
'most distinguished politician in our history."' Carrington, supra note 77, at 462, quoting
Abraham Lincoln, The Kansas-Nebraska Act, Address at Peoria, 111. (Oct. 16, 1854), in 1
ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 309 (Don E. Fehrenbach ed., 1989).
9 0 Lincoln offered gratitude that Jefferson had the capacity "to introduce into a merely revo-
lutionary document, an abstract truth, applicable to all men and all times, and so to embalm
it there, that today, and in all coming days, it shall be a rebuke and a stumbling block to the
very harbingers of reappearing tyranny and oppression." Letter from Abraham Lincoln to
Henry L. Pierce, in ABRAHAM LINCOLN, SPEECHES AND WRITINGS, supra note 89, at 18.
Surely Professor Carrington is right that "[tjhe heart of the Declaration, as expressed in the
two ideas of government by consent and equality of status, is thus a proposition of law and
the predicate to our Constitution," and the underlying theme that government "exists for us
and not we for it" is "the idea for which we have been most admired by hopeful men and
women of all countries." Carrington, supra note 77, at 463-64.
91 For an overview of the ratification-era debate over the omission of a Bill of Rights from
the Constitution as proposed, see McAffee, supra note 14, at 1227-1237.
92 A leading proponent of the unenumerated rights reading of the Ninth Amendment, the one
proffered by these casebook authors, has claimed that the "standard answer" of those defend-
ing the omission of a bill of rights was that, "in contrast to the British constitution," the pro-
posed federal Constitution "was republican; any powers not expressly granted to the federal
government.., were reserved for the people, including the wide range of inalienable human
rights that could not, in principle, be surrendered to the state." DAVID RICHARDS,
FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 220 (1989) (emphasis added). In the first
place, the Guarantee Clause of article IV of the Constitution assured every state a "republi-
can" government, and no one at the time suggested that the states were not already fully re-
publican in their natures. Second, the federalism assumption that relied on the idea that the
powers not granted "were reserved for the people" counted on the enumerated powers
scheme, but had nothing to do with the "republican" nature of the federal government. Fi-
nally, the doctrine of inalienable rights had virtually nothing to do with the "republican" na-
ture of the federal government, but James Wilson clarified that under the republican gov-
ernments of the states the people had "invested their representatives with every right and
authority which they did not in explicit terms reserve." James Wilson's Speech in the State
House Yard (Oct. 6, 1787), reprinted in 2 RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, supra note
23, at 167. It is difficult to conceive of more unrelated ideas than the concepts of enforce-
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"believers" in natural rights. Those who consistently displayed the most con-
cem for whether the natural rights were adequately secured were the people
who were the strongest advocates of the inclusion of a federal Bill of Rights.
Those who opposed a Bill of Rights did so on the theory that the federal gov-
ernment was a government of enumerated powers; it lacked the authority, they
believed, to genuinely threaten the rights considered most basic. Their fear was
that the attempt comprehensively to state rights as limitations on government
could undermine the federal government's status as a government of limited
powers and dislodge its capacity to secure rights by virtue of its restricted juris-
diction.
If this were not enough, the founding generation also displayed a willing-
ness to sacrifice the Lockean ideal of human equality to establish the union
they saw as vital to the development of the nation. They compromised on the
issue of slavery. This could be seen as an exception to a general rule by which
the founding generation attempted to remain true to its commitment to a gen-
eral theory of natural rights. But we would be wise to perceive this rejection of
the very idea of equal rights, the idea that underlay the Equal Protection Clause
adopted during the following century, as having effects that went beyond the
issue of human slavery and that implicated the entirety of thought about what
was fundamental in government. 93 It is also possible to see the issue of human
equality as haunting our constitutional order, in significant part because the law
and Constitution stood behind human slavery; Jefferson may have done us a
great favor, even if the ideals he stated were significantly ignored, in giving
voice to a model of government and man's role in the scheme of things that
couldn't be reconciled with slavery over the long haul. But even if we say a
silent thank you to Jefferson for drafting the language that became the Declara-
tion of Independence, we would do him a disservice in thinking that he stated
the ideals that animated our constitutional system through most of the Nine-
teenth Century or that what he said in the Declaration constituted binding fun-
damental law.
able inalienable fights and the commitment to a republican form of government.
931t was, after all, Jefferson whose belief in "the equal moral worth and equal moral authority
of every individual" became the "source of America's democratic equality, an equality that
was far more potent than merely the Lockean idea that everyone started at birth with the
same blank sheet." Wood, supra note 77, at 2142. "Jefferson's assumption that people were
naturally equal and sociable and possessed an innate moral sense had important implica-
tions." Id.
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